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Abstract: In this paper, I propose that applying the methods of data science to “the problem of 
whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a 
fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. By carefully selecting indicator words for 
explanation and justification, and then systematically searching for these indicators in databases 
of scholarly works in mathematics, we can get an idea of how mathematicians use these terms in 
mathematical practice and with what frequency. The results of this empirical study suggest that 
mathematical explanations do occur in research articles published in mathematics journals, as 
indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators. When compared with the use of 
justification indicators, however, the data suggest that justifications occur much more frequently 
than explanations in scholarly mathematical practice. The results also suggest that justificatory 
proofs occur much more frequently than explanatory proofs, thus suggesting that proof may be 
playing a larger justificatory role than an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the central questions in the philosophy of mathematics is whether mathematical 
explanations occur in mathematical practice (Mancosu 2018).1 According to Hanna et al. (2010, 
p. 2), “philosophers of mathematics have turned their attention more and more from the 
justificatory to the explanatory role of proof” (emphasis in original). This suggests that proof 
plays an equal, dual role in mathematics: a justificatory role and an explanatory role. As Zelcer 
(2013, p. 173) puts it, “the distinction between proofs that merely prove and proofs that are in 
some way enlightening” [...] has attracted the attention of philosophers” lately (emphasis added).2 
 
Now, instances of the word ‘explain’ and its cognates are not difficult to find in 
mathematics. Here are a few examples (emphasis added): 
 
Our proof explains this bump in graph theoretic terms (Cherlin 2016, p. 342). 
 
The above proof explains why we consider weak solutions of FBSDEs associated with 
the problem (Rozkosz 2013, p. 1079). 
 
 
1 Cf. Mancuso (2008b, p. 135) on the problem of “giving an account of mathematical explanation of empirical 
phenomena,” which is a different problem from the one about the explanatory and justificatory role of proof in 
mathematics. In this paper, I am concerned with the latter, not the former. See also Mancuso (2018). For recent work 
on mathematical explanations in science, see Andersen (2018) and Pincock (2015). 
2 On the question, “What are mathematical explanations?” see Inglis and Mejía-Ramos (2019). Again, this question 
is beyond the scope of this paper. The focus of this paper is “the problem of whether mathematical explanations 
occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018). That is, in mathematical practice (specifically, in the published 
work of practicing mathematicians), are there “proofs that merely prove” or “proofs that are in some way 
enlightening” as well? 
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There are also instances of mathematicians reflecting on their practice and saying that proofs are 
explanatory. Here are a few examples (emphasis added): 
 
A good proof explains why a result is true — it is how we mathematicians come to grips 
with something (Weintraub 1997, p. xi). 
 
a proof explains why something is true. The only requirement is that the explanation must 
be logical, so that other people will understand it (Fenton and Dubinsky 1996, p. 38). 
 
a proof explains, via deductive reasoning, why a certain conjecture should be considered 
true; that is, why the conjecture is really a theorem (Cullinane 2013, p. 125). 
 
Likewise, instances of the word ‘justify’ and its cognates are not difficult to find in mathematics, 
either. Here are a few examples (emphasis added): 
 
The following formal proof justifies such a permutation by the absence of any free 
occurrence of A in X 𝜖 U (Nievergelt 2002, p. 118). 
 
The same proof justifies the right to left direction of the lemma used by Sikorski… 
(Hinkis 2013, p. 332). 
 
There are also those who claim that proofs both explain and justify. For instance, according to 
Niss (2006, p. 57): 
 
although some proofs not only justify but also explain why a proposition is true, many 
proofs justify without providing any explanation; and sometimes there are convincing 
explanations that cannot easily be formalised into valid proofs without a given theoretical 
framework (e.g. Stokes’ theorem in vector analysis). 
 
To find out how ubiquitous such usage of ‘explain’ and ‘justify’ as applied to mathematical 
proofs is, however, a more rigorous method than selective quotation is needed. I propose that the 
sort of text mining and corpus analysis methods commonly used by data scientists and corpus 
linguists can be useful in shedding light on questions about the explanatory and justificatory 
roles that proofs play in mathematics. After all, the aforementioned quotations suggest that 
explanations do occur in mathematical practice, but they cannot tell us how frequently 
explanations and justifications occur in mathematical practice.3 
 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to examine the explanatory and justificatory roles of 
proof in mathematical practice by taking an empirical approach.4 I propose that applying the 
 
3 Cf. Pease et al. (2018) who report some empirical support for their conjecture that “there is such a thing as 
explanation in mathematics.” Their empirical study, however, was not designed to find out how frequently 
explanations and justifications occur in mathematics. 
4 The empirical methods employed in this paper are the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, such as text 
mining and corpus analysis, rather than the empirical methods of social science. For examples of the former methods 
applied to questions in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, see Pease et al. (2018) and Mizrahi (2019). For an 
example of the latter methods applied to questions in the philosophy of mathematics, see Inglis and Aberdein 
(2014). 
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methods of data science to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within 
mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. 
By carefully selecting indicator words for explanations and justifications, and then systematically 
searching for these indicators in databases of scholarly works in mathematics, we can get an idea 
of how practicing mathematicians use these terms and with what frequency. By mining texts 
from such databases, and running searches designed to find out whether the mathematical 
practice term ‘proof’ occurs in explanatory contexts or justificatory contexts, we can say with 
some confidence whether, and with what frequency, mathematicians use proof in its explanatory 
role and justificatory role. 
 
Overall, the results of this empirical study suggest that mathematical explanations do 
occur in mathematical practice, specifically, in research articles published in mathematics 
journals, as indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators. When compared with the use 
of justification indicators, however, the data suggest that justifications occur much more 
frequently than explanations in mathematical practice. The results also suggest that justificatory 
proofs occur much more frequently than explanatory proofs, thus suggesting that proof may be 
playing a larger justificatory role than an explanatory role in mathematical practice. Before I 
explain these results in detail (Section 3), however, I will describe the methodology of this 
empirical study in the next section (Section 2). In Section 4, I will discuss the implications of the 
results of this empirical study to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur 
within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018). 
 
2. Methods 
 
In introductions to logic and argumentation, it is customary to distinguish between arguments 
and explanations. The former attempt to prove, whereas the latter explain why. For instance, 
according to Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, p. 425): 
 
Explanations answer questions about how or why something happened. We explain how 
a mongoose got out of his cage by pointing to a hole he dug under the fence. We explain 
why Smith was acquitted by saying that he got off on a technicality. The purpose of 
explanations is not to prove that something happened, but to make sense of things 
(emphasis added). 
 
As many authors of logic and argumentation textbooks do, Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2005, pp. 42-43) provide a list of words that can be used as indicators or markers of arguments. 
The list includes words, such as ‘therefore’, ‘because’, and ‘since’. However, words like 
‘because’ and ‘since’ can indicate both arguments and explanations. As Copi et al. (2011, p. 18) 
put it when they distinguish between arguments and explanations in their logic textbook: 
 
If our aim is to establish the truth of some proposition, Q, and we offer some evidence, P, 
in support of Q, we may appropriately say “Q because P.” In this case we are giving an 
argument for Q, and P is our premise. Alternatively, suppose that Q is known to be true. 
In that case we don’t have to give any reasons to support its truth, but we may wish to 
give an account of why it is true. Here also we may say “Q because P”--but in this case 
we are giving not an argument for Q, but an explanation of Q (emphasis in original). 
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For these reasons, words such as ‘because’ and ‘since’ are not reliable indicators or markers of 
explanations. For, as Copi et al. (2011, p. 18) point out, “those words are used both in 
explanations and in arguments.” In addition to ‘explain’ and its cognates, then, we need words 
other than ‘because’ or ‘since’ that can serve as reliable indicators or markers for explanations as 
opposed to arguments. Following Overton (2013, p. 1386), I have used ‘account’, ‘explicate’, 
and ‘elucidate’ as additional indicator words for explanation (in addition to ‘explain’).5 Unlike 
‘because’ and ‘since’, we can be fairly confident that ‘account’, ‘explicate’, and ‘elucidate’ 
indicate explanations rather than arguments in texts. 
 
As mentioned above, unlike explanations, “which provide reasons for why or how an 
event occurred” (Baronett 2016, p. 18), the premises of an argument provide justification for its 
conclusion (Marcus 2018, p. 112). As Govier (2010, p. 2) puts it, “an argument is a reasoned 
attempt to justify a claim on the basis of other claims” (emphasis added). Now, markers or 
indicator words for arguments include the following: ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’, ‘proves that’, 
‘shows that’, and ‘demonstrates that’ (Govier 2010, pp. 5-6). The words ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, and 
the like are problematic indicators or markers of justifications for the same reason that words 
such as ‘because’ and ‘since’ are not reliable indicators or markers of explanations, i.e., they can 
be used to indicate both explanations and arguments. As Walton (2002, p. 279) puts it, “the 
indicator-words, ‘thus’, ‘therefore’, ‘consequently’, and so forth, are similar, in many ways, in 
arguments and explanations.” When it comes to mathematical proofs, the “distinction between 
nonexplanatory and explanatory mathematical proofs is often formulated in terms of the 
difference between proofs that merely establish that the conclusion is the case and proofs that 
establish why the conclusion is the case; the former demonstrate, while the latter explain” (Dutilh 
Novaes 2019, p. 71; emphasis in original).6 For these reasons, I have used ‘demonstrate’, ‘show’, 
and ‘prove’ as additional markers or indicator words for justification (in addition to ‘justify’). 
Unlike ‘therefore’ and ‘thus’, we can be fairly confident that ‘demonstrate’, ‘show’, and ‘prove’ 
indicate justifications rather than explanations in texts. The explanation and justification 
indicators I have used in this empirical study are listed in Table 1.7 
 
Table 1. Indicator words for explanation and justification 
 
Explanation indicators Justification indicators 
account demonstrate 
explain justify 
explicate prove 
 
5 Cf. Pease et al. (2018) who use ‘expla*’ and ‘underst*’ as explanation indicators. 
6 Dutilh Novaes (2019, p. 73) argues that, “In an explanatory proof, there should be no surprises: each step in the 
proof must be clear and evident, eliciting immediate understanding in whoever inspects the proof, thus ruling out 
unexpected ‘turns’.” 
7 For more on the relationship between philosophy of mathematics and argumentation theory, see Pease et al. 
(2009). Ashton and Mizrahi (2018a) use a similar methodology and the tools of data science to investigate appeals to 
intuition in philosophy. See also Ashton and Mizrahi (2018b) and Mizrahi (2019). 
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elucidate show 
 
The data driving this empirical study is taken from JSTOR Data for Research 
(jstor.org/dfr). This database allows researchers to search full texts for exact phrases and access 
the metadata associated with the search results. I have used this database to search for the 
explanation and justification indicators listed in Table 1 through research articles written in 
English. JSTOR allows for truncation or “wildcard” searches (using the asterisk * symbol). 
Accordingly, a search for ‘account*’ will yield results that include the word ‘account’ and its 
cognates, such as ‘accounting’, ‘accounted’, etc. Similarly, a search for ‘demonstrat*’ will yield 
results that include the word ‘demonstrate’ and its cognates, such as ‘demonstrating’, 
‘demonstrated’, etc. 
 
The methods of data science allow us to overcome the limitations of relying on selective 
quotation (see Section 1). For selected quotations may or may not be representative of 
mathematics as a whole. However, empirical methodologies have limitations of their own. As far 
as the methods of data science and corpus linguistics are concerned, there are two major 
limitations. First, we can only study and analyze what is explicitly mentioned in the corpus. For 
the purpose of this study, then, our corpus of mathematical texts must contain explicit mentions 
of explanations and justifications, e.g., instances of ‘explain’, ‘justify’, and the like (see Table 1), 
for us to be able to analyze means, proportions, and patterns of usage. It is reasonable to assume 
that there would be such explicit mentions of explanation indicators and justification indicators 
in mathematical texts if proofs really do play an explanatory role and a justificatory role in 
mathematics. 
 
Second, as with any empirical methodology, there may be some false positives and/or 
false negatives. When it comes to the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, false 
negatives could occur when we search for a specific term t in a corpus, but do not find it, even 
though the corpus contains a synonym of t. For example, although unlikely, it is possible that our 
corpus of mathematical texts contains no instances of ‘explain’, and so a search for ‘explain’ 
would return zero results, because mathematicians use ‘elucidate’ instead of ‘explain’ in all the 
research articles that make up our corpus. On the other hand, false positives could occur when 
we find instances of a term t in our corpus, but those instances contain irrelevant uses of t. For 
the purpose of this study, then, the corpus of mathematical texts must contain not only explicit 
mentions of explanations and justifications, e.g., instances of ‘explain’, ‘justify’, and the like (see 
Table 1), but also explicit mentions of explanation and justification indicators in the context of 
talk about proofs. For example, instances of ‘explain’ that are not about proofs (as in “this proof 
explains”) would be considered false positives for the purposes of this study. 
 
Now, there are two things we can do to overcome the limitations of our empirical, data-
driven approach. First, we can refine our search terms. For the purposes of this study, I have 
followed Pease et al. (2018), who use ‘expla*’ as an explanation indicator, but also Overton 
(2013, p. 1386) and added ‘account*’, ‘explicat*’, and ‘elucidat*’ (see Table 1). This search 
methodology is designed to minimize the number of false negatives, i.e., occurrences of 
explanation and justification in research articles published in mathematics journals that are 
indicated by words other than ‘explain’ and ‘justify’, by using synonymous indicator words, such 
as ‘account’ and ‘elucidate’. 
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Second, we can make sure that our search methodology picks out instances of 
explanation and justification indicators in the corpus that occur in the context of talk about proof. 
Since the aim of this paper is to examine the explanatory and justificatory roles of proof in 
mathematical practice, we need to search for occurrences of the explanation and justification 
indicators listed in Table 1 in the context of talk about proofs in mathematics journals. In other 
words, instead of finding out the proportion of research articles that contain occurrences of the 
explanation and justification indicators listed in Table 1 in all research articles published in a 
particular mathematics journal, we need to find out how often these indicator words occur in 
research articles that discuss proofs. Naturally, we would expect to find that many (perhaps 
most) research articles published in mathematics journals contain discussions of proofs. But 
perhaps not all of them do. Accordingly, I have searched for explanations and justifications in 
the context of talk about proofs by pairing the explanation and justification indicators listed in 
Table 1 with the mathematical practice term ‘proof’. This means that I have searched for 
explanations and justifications in the context of talk about proofs according to the following 
formula: (indicator* AND proof). For example, (expla* AND proof), (demonstrat* AND proof), 
and so on. This search methodology is designed to minimize the number of false positives, i.e., 
instances of explanation and justification indicators that are not about proofs, by ensuring that 
instances of explanation and justification indicators in text are paired with the mathematical 
practice term ‘proof’. 
 
In that respect, my methodology is different from Pease et al.’s (2018) not only in my 
choice of additional indicators but also in the data used. Pease et al. (2018, p. 6) use data mined 
from “the Mini-Polymath projects, online collaborations on a blog to solve problems drawn from 
International Mathematical Olympiads,” which contain work in progress, whereas I use data 
mined from academic journals that publish scholarly work in mathematics, and so contain 
published work. According to Colyvan et al. (2018, p. 233), however, “mathematicians are 
notorious for covering their tracks in their written work and rarely commit to print judgments of 
the explanatory powers of proof. But as anyone who has spent time with mathematicians knows, 
such judgments are forthcoming in the tea room, in the pub, and even in the classroom.” If one is 
inclined to agree with Colyvan et al. (2018, p. 233), then perhaps one would like to distinguish 
between the “public face” of mathematical practice and what goes on “behind closed doors.” 
Likewise, Hersh (1991) distinguishes between the “front” and the “back” of mathematics. Along 
the lines of this front/back distinction, then, Pease et al.’s (2018) data come from the so-called 
“behind closed doors” or the “back” of mathematical practice (e.g., chat rooms), and so their 
conclusions apply to this pre-publication aspect of mathematical practice, whereas my data come 
from the so-called “public face” or the “front” of mathematical practice (e.g., research articles 
published in mathematics journals), and so my conclusions apply to this post-publication aspect 
of mathematical practice. 
 
As far as scholarly mathematical practice is concerned, JSTOR Data for Research also 
allows for searches by subject, such as mathematics, which contains 61 journals. However, the 
mathematics category on JSTOR contains logic and math education journals as well as pure and 
applied mathematics journals. In order to focus on pure mathematics and rule out scholarly work 
in logic and math education, I removed from my datasets journals that publish work in logic, 
applied mathematics, and mathematics education. After removing those journals, as well as 
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journals that publish work in languages other than English, I was left with the following 
mathematics journals, which publish work in pure mathematics, as opposed to logic, applied 
math, or math education, from which data was mined for this empirical study: 
 
● American Journal of Mathematics (1878-2013) 
● American Mathematical Monthly (1894-2017) 
● Annals of Mathematics (1884-2019) 
● Journal of Computational Mathematics (1983-2013) 
● Journal of the American Mathematical Society (1988-2013) 
 
The years in parentheses indicate the years from which JSTOR has issues of the journal in the 
database. 
 
Accordingly, I have created datasets of research articles that contain the mathematical 
practice term ‘proof’ from each of the mathematics journals listed above, which then served as 
the base rates for calculating the proportions of explanation and justification indicators in each 
dataset. This search methodology is designed to test hypotheses about the role of proof in 
scholarly mathematical practice as follows: 
 
(1) If proofs play an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice, then we would 
expect explanation indicators to occur in the context of talk about proofs in research 
articles published in mathematics journals. 
(2) If proofs play a justificatory role in scholarly mathematical practice, then we would 
expect justification indicators to occur in the context of talk about proofs in research 
articles published in mathematics journals. 
 
Testing these hypotheses about the role of proof is philosophically significant because it might 
provide some empirical insight into “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur 
within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018). Moreover, as mentioned above, according to Hanna 
et al. (2010, p. 2), “philosophers of mathematics have turned their attention more and more from 
the justificatory to the explanatory role of proof.” This suggests that proofs play an equal, dual 
role in mathematics: a justificatory role and an explanatory role. If proofs play a justificatory role 
and an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice, more or less equally, then we should 
find that both explanation indicators and justification indicators occur in the context of talk about 
proofs in research articles published in mathematics journals with more or less equal frequency. 
 
3. Results 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the aim of this paper is to examine the explanatory and justificatory 
roles of proof in scholarly mathematical practice, which is why we need to search for 
occurrences of the explanation and justification indicators listed in Table 1 in the context of talk 
about proofs. The proportions of research articles that contain the mathematical practice term 
‘proof’ in each of the mathematics journals tested in this empirical study will then serve as our 
base rates for calculating the proportions of explanation and justification indicators in research 
articles published in those journals. These results are summed up in Table 2. All the data 
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reported in this section were first collected on July 5, 2019, and then checked for accuracy on 
April 28, 2020. 
 
Table 2. Numbers and percentages of research articles contain the mathematical practice term 
‘proof’ in five mathematics journals (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 Total number of 
research articles 
Number of research 
articles that contain 
‘proof’ 
Percentage of 
‘proof’ research 
articles 
American Journal of 
Mathematics 
7140 5057 70% 
American Mathematical 
Monthly 
39747 12541 31% 
Annals of Mathematics 6348 4679 73% 
Journal of 
Computational 
Mathematics 
1601 1189 74% 
Journal of the American 
Mathematical Society 
1072 997 93% 
 
As we can see from Table 2, with the exception of the American Mathematical Monthly, where 
31% of the research articles published in this journal contain the mathematical practice term 
‘proof’, most (between 70% and 93%) of the research articles published in all the other 
mathematics journals from which data was mined for this empirical study contain some 
discussion of proofs. 
 
Now that we have our prior probabilities of research articles that contain the 
mathematical practice term ‘proof’ in the five mathematics journals tested in this empirical 
study, we can use them to calculate the proportions of explanation indicators and justification 
indicators in the context of talk about proofs. As discussed in Section 2, this methodology can 
help us address the question of the role of proof in scholarly mathematical practice. That is, to 
find out what role proof plays in scholarly mathematical practice, we need to search for the 
explanation and justification indicators listed in Table 1 in the context of talk about proofs and 
then compare the results. In practice, this means using the following syntax to run queries in 
JSTOR Data for Research’s dataset construction interface: jcode:(journal’s jcode) (proof AND 
indicator*). For example, the jcode for the American Journal of Mathematics is amerjmath. 
Accordingly, to find out how many instances of the explanation indicator ‘account’ and its 
cognates there are in the context of talk about proofs in research articles published in the 
American Journal of Mathematics, we would run the following search query: jcode:(amerjmath) 
(proof AND account*). This query will yield the number of research articles that contain 
instances of the explanation indicator ‘account’ and its cognates in the context of talk about 
proofs. Likewise, to find out how many instances of the justification indicator ‘demonstrate’ and 
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its cognates there are in the context of talk about proofs in research articles published in the 
American Journal of Mathematics, we would run the following search query: jcode:(amerjmath) 
(proof AND demonstrat*). This query will yield the number of research articles that contain 
instances of the justification indicator ‘demonstrate’ and its cognates in the context of talk about 
proofs.8 
 
Let’s begin with the data on the explanation indicators listed in Table 1. These results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Numbers of research articles that contain each explanation indicator in the context of 
talk about proofs by journal (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 Number of 
research 
articles that 
contain ‘proof’ 
account* 
AND proof 
expla* 
AND 
proof 
explicat* 
AND proof 
elucidat* 
AND proof 
American Journal of 
Mathematics 
5057 1005 1171 14 47 
American 
Mathematical 
Monthly 
12541 1586 2277 48 98 
Annals of 
Mathematics 
4679 1095 1334 17 31 
Journal of 
Computational 
Mathematics 
1189 138 113 1 1 
Journal of the 
American 
Mathematical 
Society 
997 252 514 2 7 
  
Since we would like to be able to compare the proportions of research articles in which 
explanation indicators occur in the context of proof talk with the proportions of research articles 
in which justification indicators occur in the context of proof talk, we need to calculate the 
proportions of research articles that contain each of the explanation indicators in the context of 
proof talk. These results are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
8 The jcodes for the other mathematics journals tested in this empirical study are as follows: American Mathematical 
Monthly (amermathmont), Annals of Mathematics (annamath), Journal of Computational Mathematics (jcompmath), 
and Journal of the American Mathematical Society (jamermathsoci). 
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Figure 1. Proportions of research articles that contain each of the explanation indicators in the 
context of talk about proofs by journal (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 
 
 
As we can see from Figure 1, the highest proportions are those of the explanation indicator 
‘explain’ and its cognates across the mathematics journals tested for this empirical study, except 
for the Journal of Computational Mathematics, where the highest proportion is that of the 
explanation indicator ‘account’ and its cognates. 
 
To check that the search methodology described in Section 2 returns genuine instances of 
the phenomenon in question (namely, instances of explanation indicators in the context of talk 
about proof), I have selected at random three search results from the dataset for explanation 
indicators (emphasis added): 
 
1. “to explain the idea of the general proof, we demonstrate the proof of the functional 
equation in a simple example, which also explains the symbols used in the next sections” 
(Komori 2013, p. 1020). 
2. “We include here a proof in order to explain the relation between x and s” (Freniche 
2010, p. 443). 
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3. “The rest of the proof is exactly the same so this accounts for...” (Bestvina et al. 2013, p. 
1458). 
 
These instances of explanation indicators in research articles published in mathematics journals 
also provide context to the statistical results reported above. They illustrate how mathematicians 
use explanation indicators when they talk about proofs in scholarly mathematical practice. 
 
Let’s move on to the data on the justification indicators listed in Table 1. These results 
are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Numbers of research articles that contain each justification indicator in the context of 
talk about proofs by journal (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 Number of 
research articles 
that contain 
‘proof’ 
demonstrat* 
AND proof 
justif* 
AND 
proof 
prov* 
AND 
proof 
show* 
AND 
proof 
American Journal of 
Mathematics 
5057 579 588 4734 4677 
American 
Mathematical 
Monthly 
12541 1493 990 9541 8466 
Annals of 
Mathematics 
4679 617 710 4331 4271 
Journal of 
Computational 
Mathematics 
1189 241 61 1038 1013 
Journal of the 
American 
Mathematical Society 
997 131 176 993 815 
 
As before, since we would like to be able to compare the proportions of research articles in 
which justification indicators occur in the context of proof talk with the proportions of research 
articles in which explanation indicators occur in the context of proof talk, we need to calculate 
the proportions of research articles that contain each of the justification indicators in the context 
of proof talk. These results are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of research articles that contain each of the justification indicators in the 
context of talk about proofs by journal (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
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As we can see from Figure 2, the highest proportions are those of the justification indicator 
‘prove’ and its cognates across all the mathematics journals tested for this empirical study. 
 
Again, to check that the search methodology described in Section 2 returns genuine 
instances of the phenomenon in question (namely, instances of justification indicators in the 
context of talk about proof), I have selected at random three search results from the dataset for 
justification indicators (emphasis added): 
 
1. “Proof of (b). To justify (b) for…” (Martel and Merle 2011, p. 847). 
2. “Proof. We first demonstrate (i)” (Ren 2012, p. 540). 
3. “Resuming the proof of the main theorem, it has been shown that…” (Sylvester 1886, p. 
245). 
 
These instances of justification indicators in research articles published in mathematics journals 
also provide context to the statistical results reported above. They illustrate how mathematicians 
use justification indicators when they talk about proofs in scholarly mathematical practice. 
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Now that we have the proportions of explanation indicators and justification indicators in 
the context of proof talk, we are in a position to compare these proportions. From Figures 1 and 
2, it is evident that justification indicators occur much more frequently in the context of proof 
talk than explanation indicators do. For example, the explanation indicator ‘explain’ and its 
cognates occur in 51% of the research articles published in the Journal of the American 
Mathematical Society that contain proof talk. Among the mathematics journals tested in this 
empirical study, it is the highest proportion of research articles that contain any of the 
explanation indicators listed in Table 1. By contrast, in the same journal, the justification 
indicator ‘prove’ and its cognates occur in 99% of the research articles that contain proof talk. 
Among the mathematics journals tested in this empirical study, it is the highest proportion of 
research articles that contain any of the justification indicators listed in Table 1. 
 
Nevertheless, it would be useful to test rigorously if these differences between the 
proportions of explanation and justification indicators are statistically significant. To do so, I 
compared the most frequently mentioned explanation indicator with the most frequently 
mentioned justification indicator within research articles published by the same mathematics 
journal (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Results of z-tests for proportions comparing the most frequent explanation indicators 
with the most frequent justification indicators by journal (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 Most frequent 
explanation indicator 
Most frequent 
justification indicator 
z-
value 
p 
American Journal of 
Mathematics 
expla* 
0.23 
prov* 
0.93 
70.59 0.00 
American Mathematical 
Monthly 
expla* 
0.18 
prov* 
0.76 
91.88 0.00 
Annals of Mathematics expla* 
0.28 
prov* 
0.92 
63.38 0.00 
Journal of Computational 
Mathematics 
account* 
0.11 
prov* 
0.87 
36.91 0.00 
Journal of the American 
Mathematical Society 
expla* 
0.51 
prov* 
0.99 
24.96 0.00 
 
For example, the aforementioned difference is indeed statistically significant. That is, a z-test for 
proportions was conducted to find that the difference between the proportion of research articles 
published in the Journal of the American Mathematical Society that contain the explanation 
indicator ‘explain’ and its cognates in the context of proof talk (0.51) and the proportion of 
research articles published in the Journal of the American Mathematical Society that contain the 
justification indicator ‘prove’ and its cognates in the context of proof talk (0.99) is statistically 
significant (z = 24.96, p = 0.00, two-sided). As we can see from Table 5, the same can be said 
about the difference in proportions between those of the top explanation indicator, which is 
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‘explain’ and its cognates in all the mathematics journals tested in this empirical study, with the 
exception of the Journal of Computational Mathematics (where the most frequently mentioned 
explanation indicator is ‘account’ and its cognates), and those of the top justification indicator, 
which is ‘prove’ and its cognates in all the mathematics journals tested in this empirical study. 
All these differences in proportions are statistically different at 99%. These results suggest that 
justification indicators occur significantly more frequently than explanation indicators do in the 
context of talk about proofs in research articles published in mathematics journals. 
 
In addition, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the proportions of 
explanatory proofs and the proportions of justificatory proofs across all the mathematics journals 
tested in this empirical study. There was a significant difference between justificatory proofs (M 
= 0.49, SD = 0.38, N = 20) and explanatory proofs (M = 0.11, SD = 0.13, N = 20), t(24) = -4.15, 
p < 0.00, two-tailed. These results suggest that justificatory proofs are significantly more 
frequent than explanatory proofs in scholarly mathematical practice. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
As discussed in Section 2, this empirical study was designed to test hypotheses about the role of 
proof in scholarly mathematical practice as follows: 
 
(1) If proofs play an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice, then we would 
expect explanation indicators to occur in the context of talk about proofs in research 
articles published in mathematics journals. 
(2) If proofs play a justificatory role in scholarly mathematical practice, then we would 
expect justification indicators to occur in the context of talk about proofs in research 
articles published in mathematics journals. 
 
The results of this empirical study show that explanation indicators occur in the context of talk 
about proofs in research articles published in mathematics journals. In that respect, these results 
shed new light on “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics 
itself” (Mancosu 2018), for they suggest that explanations do occur in scholarly mathematical 
practice because explanation indicators do appear in research articles published in mathematics 
journals. That is, if the explanation indicators listed in Table 1 are reliable indicators for the 
presence (or absence) of explanations in scholarly mathematical practice, and if what practicing 
mathematicians say and do in their published work is representative of scholarly mathematical 
practice, then the results of this empirical study suggest that explanations do occur within 
mathematics itself. This result is in line with Pease et al.’s (2018, p. 17) data in support of their 
conjecture that “there is such a thing as explanation in mathematics.” 
 
The results of this empirical study also show that justification indicators occur in the 
context of talk about proofs in research articles published in mathematics journals as well. That 
is, if the justification indicators listed in Table 1 are reliable indicators for the presence (or 
absence) of justifications in scholarly mathematical practice, and if what practicing 
mathematicians say and do in their published work is representative of scholarly mathematical 
practice, then the results of this empirical study suggest that justifications occur within 
mathematics itself as well. 
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Interestingly, however, when we compare the proportion of explanation indicators in 
mathematics research articles that contain proof talk with the proportion of justification 
indicators in mathematics research articles that contain proof talk across all the mathematics 
journals tested in this empirical study, we find that, in general, the latter is significantly larger 
than the former. In other words, mathematical explanations do occur in scholarly mathematical 
practice, as indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators in mathematics research 
articles, but not as frequently as justifications generally do. In other words, the results of this 
empirical study suggest that justifications occur significantly more frequently than explanations 
do in mathematics itself. 
 
As far as the question concerning the explanatory and justificatory roles of proof in 
mathematical practice, then, the results of this empirical study suggest that proof does play this 
dual role in scholarly mathematical practice, given that both explanation indicators and 
justification indicators occur in the context of talk about proofs in research articles published in 
mathematics journals. However, once again, when we compare the proportion of explanation 
indicators in the context of proof talk to the proportion of justification indicators in the context of 
proof talk in research articles published in all the mathematics journals tested in this empirical 
study, we find that, in general, the latter is significantly larger than the former. This result 
suggests that proof may be playing a larger justificatory than explanatory role in scholarly 
mathematical practice. This result is not what we would have expected to find if proof plays an 
equal, dual role in mathematics: a justificatory role and an explanatory role. As discussed in 
Section 2, if proofs played a justificatory role and an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical 
practice, more or less equally, then we would find that both explanation indicators and 
justification indicators occur in the context of talk about proofs in research articles published in 
mathematics journals with more or less equal frequency. What we actually find, however, is that 
justificatory proofs are significantly more frequent than explanatory proofs in scholarly 
mathematical practice. 
 
For philosophers of mathematics, I submit, the philosophical significance of these results 
consists in getting us a bit closer to having a more accurate picture of mathematical practices. 
After all, to study any practice, we need to have an accurate picture of what that practice is like. 
The results of this empirical study, then, contribute to this ongoing project in philosophy of 
mathematics. For if there are significantly more justificatory proofs than explanatory proofs in 
scholarly mathematical practice, as the results of this empirical study suggest, but philosophers 
of mathematics focus on one more than the other, then it looks like philosophers of mathematics 
might be getting a rather distorted picture of scholarly mathematical practice. If philosophers of 
mathematics want to have an accurate picture of what scholarly mathematical practice is like, 
then it is important to know which role of proof is the rule and which role of proof is the 
exception. The results of this empirical study suggest that, as far as scholarly mathematical 
practice is concerned, justificatory proofs, not explanatory proofs, are the rule. In that case, 
“taking mathematical practice seriously” (Carter 2019, p. 2) means taking the aforementioned 
results suggesting that justificatory proofs are the rule, whereas explanatory proofs are the 
exception, seriously and adjusting our attention as philosophers of mathematics accordingly. 
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Beyond the aforementioned results, the methodology used to obtain these results has 
philosophical significance as well. According to Mancosu (2008a, p. 2), “attention to 
mathematical practice is a necessary condition for a renewal of the philosophy of mathematics.” 
Along these lines, the methodology employed here provides an empirical way to study 
mathematical practices on a broader scale than the traditional methods of philosophy of 
mathematics, such as the method of case studies.9 Relying on a few case studies might provide 
an inaccurate picture of what mathematical practices are really like, for the selected case studies 
may simply be outliers.10 On the other hand, the methods of text mining and corpus analysis used 
in this paper can provide a more accurate picture of what mathematical practices are like than the 
case study method can precisely because of the use of more data systematically mined from 
databases of large corpora of scholarly work done by practicing mathematicians.11 In other 
words, if philosophers of mathematics are serious about “taking mathematical practice seriously” 
(Carter 2019, p. 2), then that means an “[e]xtension of methodologies brought in to deal with 
[questions related to mathematics]” (Carter 2019, p. 27). In that respect, the methods of data 
science, such as text mining, corpus analysis, data visualization, and the like, could provide a set 
of useful tools for studying mathematical practices. 
 
Of course, investigating particular cases of explanatory proofs in mathematical practices 
may still be a useful and worthwhile endeavor in philosophy of mathematics. In that respect, it is 
important to recall the distinction between the so-called “behind closed doors” or the “back” of 
mathematical practice (e.g., chat rooms) and the so-called “public face” or the “front” of 
mathematical practice (e.g., research articles published in mathematics journals), and that the 
conclusions of this empirical study apply to the latter, not the former. It is possible, then, that 
mathematical explanations could occur implicitly in the “back rooms” or “chat rooms” of 
mathematics, which can be accessed by philosophers of mathematics through case studies and 
interviews with practicing mathematicians. Accordingly, empirical and quantitative methods, 
such as those employed in this paper, can serve to complement rather than replace traditional and 
qualitative methods of philosophical inquiry, such as the method of case studies. 
 
Some philosophers of mathematics might insist that they should direct their attention to 
explanatory proofs, the empirical evidence suggesting that explanatory proofs are significantly 
less frequent than justificatory proofs in scholarly mathematical practice notwithstanding. This 
would be a normative claim, of course, on which the empirical findings of this empirical study 
have no bearing directly, unless those philosophers of mathematics share an interest in portraying 
mathematical practices in our philosophical accounts of mathematics as accurately as possible. If 
they do not share this research interest, however, then those philosophers of mathematics might 
argue that philosophers of mathematics should direct their attention to explanatory proofs for 
reasons other than accuracy. For instance, they might think that explanatory proofs are 
particularly interesting, more so than justificatory proofs, and thus deserving of the attention of 
philosophers of mathematics. Nevertheless, as Maddy (1997, p. 161) puts it, “If our 
philosophical account of mathematics comes into conflict with successful mathematical practice, 
 
9 See, e.g., McLarty (2008) for a use of a case study in the philosophy of mathematics. 
10 On methodological issues in philosophy of mathematics, see Cellucci (2013). On the use of case studies in 
philosophy of science, see Mizrahi (2020). 
11 For more on the application of text mining and corpus analysis methods to philosophy of logic and mathematics, 
see Pease et al. (2018) and Mizrahi (2019). 
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it is the philosophy that must give.” Accordingly, if we have reasons to believe on empirical 
grounds that justificatory proofs, not explanatory proofs, are the rule in scholarly mathematical 
practice, then our philosophical accounts of mathematics need to account for these empirical 
findings, or so I would suggest. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have taken an empirical approach to “the problem of whether mathematical 
explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018). In particular, I have applied the 
sort of text mining and corpus analysis methods commonly used by data scientists and corpus 
linguists to questions about the explanatory and justificatory roles that proofs play in 
mathematics. The results of this empirical study suggest that mathematical explanations do occur 
in scholarly mathematical practice, as indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators in 
research articles published in mathematics journals. When compared with the use of justification 
indicators, however, the data suggest that justifications occur much more frequently than 
explanations in scholarly mathematical practice. The results also suggest that justificatory proofs 
occur much more frequently than explanatory proofs, thus suggesting that proof may be playing 
a larger justificatory role than an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice. I propose 
that our philosophical accounts of mathematics need to explain (or, at the very least, explain 
away) these empirical findings. 
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